<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>PAP on HackingPassion.com : root@HackingPassion.com-[~]</title><link>https://hackingpassion.com/tags/pap/</link><description>Recent content in PAP on HackingPassion.com : root@HackingPassion.com-[~]</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 12:55:58 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackingpassion.com/tags/pap/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>OpenBSD Let Attackers Log In With an Empty Password for 27 Years</title><link>https://hackingpassion.com/openbsd-pap-empty-password-bypass/</link><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 12:55:58 +0200</pubDate><guid>https://hackingpassion.com/openbsd-pap-empty-password-bypass/</guid><description>&lt;p>A 27-year-old flaw in &lt;strong>OpenBSD&lt;/strong> let attackers bypass its &lt;strong>PPP&lt;/strong> login with nothing more than an empty username and an empty password.
Hand a vulnerable system a blank name and a blank password, and its own login check treated that as a perfect match and let the connection in.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The problem sits in the part of OpenBSD that handles &lt;strong>PPP&lt;/strong>, the protocol behind many DSL and fiber connections, usually carried through &lt;strong>PPPoE&lt;/strong>. When two machines set up that kind of link, one side can ask the other to prove who it is. One of the older ways to do that is &lt;strong>PAP&lt;/strong>, the Password Authentication Protocol. One machine sends a name and a password, the other checks them against what it has stored, and if they match the link comes up.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>